“Beauty is truth, truth is beauty.” —John Keats, 1820

The ideas of beauty of a given time or culture are pivotal to any examination and understanding of that time or culture because they are often among the first ideas to reflect its essential values. These ideas determine not only what is beautiful but what is meaningful and important to that time or culture. Philosophers, art historians and other authors who have investigated the cultural history of beauty often start out by pointing to the Platonic notion of kalokagathēia, for which “beautiful form or appearance” expresses a “moral good,” thereby making these two concepts, beauty and the moral good, inseparable from each other. In other words, kalokagathēia says that the experience of beauty is one intrinsically linked to an idea of ethical behavior, of expressing something beautiful or sacred because it reflects a moral principle: “it is beautiful because it is good.”

But Plato not only associated the beautiful with the good. What is good is good because it corresponds better than other possible choices to the ultimate ideal of the good. It is therefore also truer than other choices: just as what is beautiful indicates a higher moral value, so is it
also expressive of a greater degree of truth. This capacity for greater truth is a relevant factor in understanding today’s beauty culture and its ideals, as these ideals tend to be based in a truth to the self, in being true to oneself in a society that has shifted from mass media to social media.

Because of this tight interweaving of the aesthetic, moral, and epistemological dimensions, Platonic perspective sees beauty as deeply involved in the realm of politics; for if outer beauty is the expression of an inner disposition of the soul, it is likewise an indicator of the kinds of character and behavior that a polis requires to function well. Plato wrote about this in many of his dialogues but most famously in *The Republic*:

- Therefore, if someone’s soul has a fine and beautiful character and his body matches it in beauty and is thus in harmony with it, so that both share in the same pattern, wouldn’t that be the most beautiful sight for anyone who has eyes to see?
- It certainly would.
- And isn’t what is most beautiful also what is most lovable?

The affinity between beauty and moral rectitude presumed to be proclaimed by Plato here has had a long pedigree and emerges in multiple related forms. The most systematic philosopher of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant, dedicated separate books to each of Plato’s pillars—truth,
goodness, and beauty—but still found fundamental structural similarities among them. In the case of beauty, for instance, the objective guarantor of the beautiful status of an object was its correspondence to its full or complete form, that is, to that which it should be and would be if allowed to come to fruition undisturbed. While the Romantics bristled at the idea promoted by Kant that beauty creates a sense of calm detachment in the beholder—since in a perfect object nothing remains to be desired and, in fact, its very beauty is by definition free from our desires and particularities—they often continued to accept at least an implicit connection between aesthetic appeal and the realms of truth and goodness.

The nineteenth-century French novelist Stendhal (2009: 32)—who felt dizziness and an accelerated heartbeat in the presence of sublime beauty that he found, in one instance, at the tombs of the Renaissance heroes in Florence—famously interpreted beauty as inciting “a promise for happiness.” For Stendhal, beauty promised something else than itself, a transcendence toward another realm, be that religious, spiritual, sensual, or a feeling of belonging. For instance, in his On Love, the young male character Beyle travels to Milan and finds beauty in his first encounter with a beautiful Italian woman, presenting love now as a synonym for beauty and, beyond that, for home:

he first visited Italy in 1800, aged seventeen, and swiftly fell in love with his first Italian belle and with Italian opera [...]. Although he returned to France many times, Beyle grumbled about the poverty of his country’s art and social
diversions, and always longed to be back in Italy, which he felt was his true home. (Stendhal 2009: xiii-xiv)

Similarly, for the English poet William Blake, artistic creation needed to be guided by excessive, transgressive appetites; and yet his reasoning still anchored that ideal in another. As he wrote, “the road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom” (Blake 2011, 66).

But what about beauty from the twentieth-century to the present day? Did the disruption of the Avant-garde decimate these connections between appearance, truth, and belonging? Are traditional terms still valid for today’s economy of beauty? In the pages that follow I approach these complex questions by starting with some important pillars in beauty culture from late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century thought. As will soon be clear, I believe our current beauty standards and ideals are in many ways still built upon these pillars and are thus anchored in the Platonic concept of kalókagatheia—even as the concept has been transferred from a society of mass media to one of social media (Apprich 2018: xi). What has transpired, however, is that the idea of what exemplifies the beautiful has been fragmented and proliferated, now increasingly individual and less homogenized. In today’s beauty economy, the things that count as beautiful can be so different that they appear totally unrelated, which may be the reason why today’s beauty ideals do not create a sense of “belonging” or “home” in such stably recognizable patterns as the Italian Renaissance did for the young Beyle. Nonetheless, as suggested by Hito Steyerl (2018: 15), it may be that our age of “computer vision” induces a new Neolithic age of “magical thinking and pattern projections” in which we discern unity and
commonality behind the whirling sea of data in which we swim. In other words, despite the proliferation of beauty ideals, an underlying fusion of the beautiful with truth and goodness has perhaps managed to survive the dissolution of the sort of universalism that Kant argued was necessary for true aesthetic judgment. In other words, “beauty” as we know it might be in decline but its synonyms of goodness and truth are not.

*The Marriage of Truth and Beauty*

As I have written elsewhere (2006; 2011), the western philosophical tradition’s revitalization of Greek beauty ideals in the nineteenth century entailed the moral devaluation of physiognomic traits of certain ethnicities or cultural groups. This devaluation took place in the service of a politics and ideology of colonial mastery and European racial supremacy. Already in the late eighteenth century, an early physiognomist like the immensely popular Swiss doctor Johann Kasper Lavater (John Caspar Lavater in English) was writing pocket manuals that categorized and ranked people into types that were clearly visible through bodily traits, such as skull size and the shape or setting of the eyes. Lavater was looking for an improvement in faces, a “progress” toward beauty, which is also how he labeled his images. For instance, a sequence from February 17, 1797, in which Lavater shows the progress of beauty from a “Beginning Beauty” (Figure 1.1) of a “forehead that, albeit a bit more covered by hair, is not progressive and the chin and eyebrows aren’t pronounced enough” to a “Progress of Beauty” (Figure 1.2) where we can see “a less bent forehead, a less prominent nose, the eyebrows better formed, and the upper lip more ‘lieblich,’ meaning lovely [which is a word that is not only gendered but
even resonates a childlike quality] the chin a bit rounder, and the eye showing fewer wrinkles”

(Lavater, 1789: 135).¹

Figure 1.1: Lavater’s depiction of “Beginning Beauty” (1797)

¹ Captions translated from the German by the author.
In the century that followed, the idea that inner, moral qualities could be read on the surface of the body proliferated and informed powerful and persistent racial and ultimately racist theories, such as those of the Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso, whose enormously influential work categorized criminals into recognizable and often racialized types and levels of deviance.²

In fact, nineteenth-century Europe was not only obsessed with finding a connection between a person’s inner soul and its outer expression or representation but also obsessed with beauty

² On Lombroso and his enduring influence, see, among others, Knepper and Ystehede 2013.
culture as such. The idea, still going back to the Greeks, was that only art was capable of expressing true beauty and among these “beaux arts,” the “beautiful arts” as they were called in France, numbered painting, sculpture, architecture and, of course, music. Friedrich Hegel’s monumental history of artistic thought and expression in his lectures on aesthetics aligned all forms of expression into a progression leading through the sensual stages of experience toward ever purer and ideal forms of knowledge. For Hegel, paradoxically, his own age was a time when that experience of art was no longer possible, as human consciousness had advanced to a more abstract level than could be expressed through sensuous media.

In Hegel’s immediate wake, Arthur Schopenhauer would speak of the experience of beauty in music as a fundamental principle of the Romantic period because it is music that is capable of articulating the “innermost nature of the world” (Schopenhauer 1969: 1:260), a pure expression of will without any mediation of reason or representation. This Romantic notion of music as capable of acting directly on our will, our emotions, our “passions,” became a prominent idea in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, whose early enthusiasm for the works of Richard Wagner resonated with the convictions in his Birth of Tragedy that the Dionysian impulse that fed the early Greek tragedies should be revived in his time. Nietzsche’s insight that truth sometimes departed radically from what a given culture believed was beautiful, however, would lay the groundwork for a twentieth-century culture the aesthetic ideals of which would come to favor disruption, convulsion, and even outright ugliness, echoing the prophetic words of Nietzsche (1968: §822), “truth is ugly. We possess art lest we perish of the truth.” Indeed, while Nietzsche defended a notion of art as a buffer from truth, many of his contemporaries in European letters
were developing the literary practice of realism that would judge the quality of a work according to its truthfulness, no matter how hard the reality it strove to represent.

*The Disruption of Beauty*

To summarize: the concept inherited by nineteenth-century thought emphasized the resulting of beauty from an inner disposition of the soul, like the “golden ratio” that was, for the Greeks, divine or God-given, and that humanity needed to remember and locate in the past in order to recreate a perfect pattern. Beauty’s perfect dimensions and proportion were to be found in nature. Such “natural beauty” was the basis of many Renaissance buildings and had been found by the thirteenth-century mathematician Fibonacci in the naturally occurring sequences that determine perfectly beautiful proportionality. While internalizing the culture of classical imitation or “classical beauty ideals” with all its nomenclatures and systems for defining an absolute beauty, European culture also invents and advances ways of excluding those left out by the cultural canon, those neither seen nor given a voice. Let’s not forget that the beauty of nineteenth-century physiognomists like Lombroso and Samuel Wells—who “disqualified” certain ethnic body traits, such as the unibrow, as “deviant” and indicative of potentially criminal characteristics—was used as justification to establish “racial laws” to persecute and eventually exterminate entire races. Here history remembers Eugen Fischer, whose pseudoscience informed the racist Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany.
While Lavater, Lombroso, and Wells justified their discrimination on cultural values that were themselves based in essentialist racisms such as “Jews steal” or “Southern Italians are dishonest,” a jump somewhat far afield to today sees the current media culture camouflage such essentialisms in algorithms that are detached from a human eye yet equally harsh in their disqualifications of body traits. The US Department of Homeland Security has developed software that supposedly predicts criminal behavior. Not surprisingly, ProPublica, a non-profit platform for investigative journalism in the US, found that the algorithmically computed “risk scores” were both remarkably unreliable and racist: “the formula was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as white defendants” (Angwin, Larson, Mattu, and Kirchner 2016). Florian Cramer’s 2018 article, “Crappiness Hermeneutics: Interpretation as the Blindspot of Analytics, Artificial Intelligence, and Other Algorithmic Producers of the Postapocalyptic Present” (23) opens with John Cayley’s observation that “language is easy to capture but difficult to read.” This is exactly the situation as it pertains to the disruption of beauty by the twentieth-century media revolution. The “language of beauty” had now been optimized, not least in that it has been driven by research into attractiveness.

As Nora Ruck and I have argued in our article “Physiognomy, Reality Television and the Cosmetic Gaze” (2011: 43), recent work in these fields has “suggested that beautiful faces are actually average(d) faces.” We cite research that “used a digital morphing program explicitly inspired by Galton’s composite portraiture to create averaged faces. Several faces were photographed, and then each represented by 512 × 512 numeric grey values. These matrices were arithmetically averaged and on the basis of them a series of achromatic composite facial
images was created” (Wegenstein and Ruck 2011: 43). On the basis of such research, computer programs like that developed and patented by the facial surgeon Stephen Marquardt could be used to impose a “golden mask of beauty” over any digitized image to create an idealized version of the client.

Cosmetic make up applications

We can apply cosmetic make-up in order to give the illusion that the face more closely approximated the Golden Mask.

![Cosmetic make up examples](image)

As with Lavater and Lombroso, what is at stake for Marquardt is a kind of apophenic “pattern discrimination,” the discernment of a projected ideal of beauty into faces that may in fact not need much “adjustment,” as the examples in Figure 1.3 serve to show.
Perhaps through a Hegelian kind of “cunning of history,” once we push one ideal to its extreme we see emerge both its counter-ideal along with a resistance to the values originally expressed by it. This process might be shown via a semiotic square, in which the meaning of a content is also defined and characterized by its counter-meaning as well as by its negation, both of which are equally, albeit silently, connotated, implied or somehow activated. Let’s create for instance a semiotic square of beauty based on the model of Algirdas Julien Greimas (Schleifer 1983, xxxii) in Fig. 1.4:

![Semiotic Square Diagram](image)

*Figure 1.4: Schema of Greimas’s semiotic square*

If we superimpose nineteenth-century beauty ideals on the semiotic square, beauty could be the effect of any “truth” or of any “value” that one believes to be a producer of truth. If, for example, we put a classical notion of truth à la Fibonacci’s ratio at position S1, the negation and implication chain could eventually produce a notion of convulsive beauty such as that which the movement of avant-garde art and literature embraced in the early twentieth century.
Indeed, in some sense it is precisely such a contradiction of the harmonious ideal of beauty that the twentieth century produces. If Romanticism had toyed with and ultimately embraced notions of excess in the service of truth and if Nietzsche equated truth with ugliness in his elevation of the art of self-creation, then the avant-garde would make a project of finding its ideals in the direct contradiction of beauty’s implicit value. *L’art pour l’art* was the mantra of a time and movement that sought to detach artistic creation and aesthetic value from any justifying apparatus at all. From music to abstract painting and poetry, the art of the avant-garde becomes intentionally, in the view of José Ortega y Gasset (1925), “dehumanized,” its difficulty and resistance to consumption part and parcel of the beauty ideal of the age becoming more autonomous. At the end of his novel *Nadja*, André Breton (1960: 160), the theorist and lead practitioner of the French surrealists, would loudly proclaim that “beauty will be CONVULSIVE, or will not be at all.”

And yet it is precisely this self-contained, self-contented notion of the beautiful that would lead the Marxist cultural critic Theodor Adorno (1967: 34) to utter that sentiment so often misquoted and misunderstood, that “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.” As he explains in the passage in which the quotation originally occurred, “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied contemplation” (Adorno 1967: 34). Adorno’s position was that art as well as criticism must release itself from the bonds of
reification—of accepting the world as it is as if it were as it had to be—in order to avoid participating in that very reification. In this way, the twentieth century produced both a contrary term to the classical aesthetic ideal of truth as beauty by making it independent of that relationship and then, in a further negation, produced a contradictory notion, subordinating beauty to a duty to truth—in the form of critique—with which it can never entirely coincide.

In his *Storia della bellezza* (2004), so widely read that I recently discovered it in Mandarin on the coffee table of my hotel room in Beijing, Umberto Eco makes an important distinction between this nineteenth-century idea of “beauty” as a Schopenhauerian experience of transcendence and the idea of a human desire for beauty as a sexual desire or an experience of consumption in general, one that says “I want to have this because it is so beautiful.” These two experiences, he emphasizes, are completely distinct. What interests Eco, of course, is the first notion of beauty, not the one we can possess or consume but the one that takes us to a different level of happiness in the Stendhalian sense. Eco means Beauty with a capital B, a Beauty capable, in the sense of Schopenhauer, of expressing the “inner kernel” of an artwork’s Truth. Such beauty is not made for consumption but is an expression of *kalokagathèia*, where the beautiful meets the good in order to become truth. This Beauty outlasts a singular or even collective human desire and, instead, speaks to us in the language of eternity. Here I am thinking of such classic examples examined by Eco as the Venus of Willendorf or Anita Ekberg dancing in the Trevi Fountain in Federico Fellini’s *La dolce vita*, examples of an abundant female body that promises the survival of a species through bodily traits that enable successful
procreation. Or alternately the examination of its male counterparts from Caravaggio’s Boy with a Basket of Fruit to Arnold Schwarzenegger’s body in Commando, to name just a few of the historical beauty arcs quoted in Storia della bellezza. As we will see, the concept of beauty that grounds such examples is at the same time a construction of a clearly defined binary gender paradigm that today—thanks to factors ranging from digital modification technology to a rising mainstream culture of difference—is no longer a given for current beauty standards.

I would be afraid to break the news to my former beloved teacher at the Università degli Studi di Bologna—who taught me the foundations of semiotics that would profoundly influence my humanistic research paths as well as my future work as a filmmaker—that “Beauty” as he knew and examined it in his History of Beauty no longer dominates preoccupations in a zeitgeist of DIY aesthetics informed and even formed by algorithms working their way in the capitalist surveillance culture of the internet. As I will show in what follows, where the twentieth century promoted an oppositional notion to the classical beauty ideal, we are today, for a variety of reasons mostly stemming from the media revolution of the digital age, awash in a multitude of new ideals of beauty, especially female beauty, that concern liberation and self-modification as a form of self-expression and self-formation. Today it is thus appropriate to investigate the idea of beauty from a cultural and aesthetic standpoint that questions the Platonic triad of beauty-good-truth while also asking what has been left of that triad in a day and age of a deep skepticism if not downright resistance to the notion that beauty could be or could even want to be universal. As I will show with the below case studies, I believe such skepticism is the effect of
a beauty concept that is no longer a vehicle of transcendence but rather a means of self-definition and self-realization.

As we see in the voices of resistance on Instagram’s #metoo community and among the followers, for instance, of the Baltimore-based TT The Artist’s #ttsart21 redefinition of a “black is beautiful” culture (Fig 1.5) that celebrates the difference of blackness in music, design, and fashion, beauty in the twenty-first century is beauty-on-demand. It can not only be digitally created and/or manipulated by any consumer who has access to the necessary tools but also—and more importantly—needs no reference to God or the evaluation of a beauty critic to validate a new, individually created aesthetic.

\[\text{Figure 1.5: Instagram post by TT The Artist (2019)}\]
In today’s digital consumer society beauty is produced by anyone and anyone can also be watching and tracing our creations on Pinterest or other popular social platforms of “beauty or trend inspirations.” In the midst of this potential chaos, the crucial question is one that Hito Steyerl (2018: 2) raises: namely, “how to extract a [reliable] signal from the noise of excessive data?” In the new digital realm, anything that “disturbs” the signal and seems irrelevant to it will not be “decoded,” which means that the new digital environment of “disruptive beauty” is one of a self-fulfilling prophecy: it creates exactly what it is looking for, as will be discussed below.

The pressing question I believe is this: whether this “new beauty ideal” that is made up of pixels and algorithms still strives to be truthful, prescriptive, and shared in a community, as its Platonic origin suggests and as Schopenhauer would strive for and, moreover, whether it is still a driving force behind our teleological narratives of who we want to be as humans. In other words, is beauty still a search for “home” in Stendhal’s sense? And, finally, do we even still consider an aesthetic experience an experience of “beauty” in a day and age when we all can be beautiful with such apps as Beauty in My Pocket, YouCAM Makeup, FaceTune, or Facial Massage that are just one click away on our cellular phones?

*Personalized Beauty in Twenty-First-Century Consumerism*

So where are we now? Have beauty ideals been definitively disrupted by patterns of data projection that are themselves built on pillars of a language that nobody has the semiotic skills
to interpret anymore? What would Eco say? Or to again quote Hito Steyerl (2018: 14), has “the twenty-first-century augur create[d] the image before the event, anticipating its effect and calling forth reality”? Or perhaps we have not “disrupted” beauty at all but rather “destroyed” its very conceptualization?

In an interesting experiment by the artists Sagmeister & Walsh for their 2018 exhibit “Beauty” at the Museum of Applied Art in Vienna, the artists counted the appearance of the word beauty itself since 1800 and came to the conclusion that it was found less and less in the books scanned between 1800 and 2000 (Figure 1.6).

While I am not acquainted with Sagmeister & Walsh’s methods or the number of books featuring the word “beauty” had not yet been digitized when they executed their search, I am nonetheless inclined to believe that there is truth in this anecdotal research. The reason is that

![Figure 1.6: Sagmeister & Walsh's measurement of the frequency of the word "beauty" in books from 1800](image)
“beauty” as we know it from nineteenth-century thought as a notion in search of ultimate meaning and relevance, one that we all potentially share as a human race, the Beauty-with-a-capital-B that Eco was tracing in his cultural history—I am afraid to say that such Beauty is no more. The beauty concept prevalent in today’s consumer-based capitalized culture is one that feeds on personal significance. It is no longer an abstract notion that is somehow there before the fact because it was God given or inherent to a golden shape or form. No, today’s beauty belongs to the “individual.” It is the result of a personal search and self-realization. It is “my beauty” or “iBeauty.” Below I analyze the notion and status quo of this new beauty in some examples from the contemporary cultural landscape on- and offline.

Before that, I would like to look back at the internalized notions of beauty discussed above and the question of whether and how these remain with us. In other words, if accepting the fact that, in the global village, we no longer strive for an absolute Beauty, then whence do we receive our notions of beauty? And how do we communicate them? If the Oxford English Dictionary comes up with the two main denotations for the term “beauty” in Figure 1.7
then it seems we are still dealing with a “quality” that is “pleasing” our aesthetic senses. But what are these?

In various other experiments and examples from their accompanying catalogue, Sagmeister & Walsh (2018) reiterate that we have always quickly and intuitively known what beauty is because there is a cognitive background to choosing one specific shape and form over another. This process was described by Norbert Schwarz (2018: 25) who is interested in the metacognitive experience of finding beauty in truth, be it in science or in art: “when an object is easy to perceive, people evaluate it as more beautiful than when it is difficult to perceive; similarly, when a statement is easy to process, people are more likely to accept it as true than when it is difficult to process. Psychologists refer to the ease or difficulty of information processing as ‘processing fluency.’” Sagmeister & Walsh go further to interpret this as an evolutionary choice, as described by Matthew Willcox (2015: 41): “an object is attractive when it is familiar, which means that it might not represent any danger for me such as eating me.”
The notion of a kind of biological utility to beauty was at least implicit in the work of the nineteenth-century theorists as well. By that time, Lavater’s ideas had already permeated culture, literature, art, medicine and the emerging social sciences (Percival 2005: 18). If, for Lavater, man’s essence lay in his soul and the body was just its mirror, then more and more scientists considered the body itself to be man’s essence. Sir Francis Galton in the nineteenth century provides an especially rich contrast to Lavater. Galton was very impressed by his cousin Charles Darwin’s insights and, with his 1892 book *Hereditary Genius*, he aimed to show that character and intelligence were hereditary. But as it was for Lavater, the key to that character and intelligence was in the face. To ensure he was being objective in his analysis, Galton turned to a new technology: photography. He organized his photographs of faces into groups whose members shared the same hereditary raw material via a visual method called composite portraiture, an averaged figure meant to bring into evidence “all the traits in which there is agreement, and to leave but a ghost of a trace of individual peculiarities” (Galton 1883: 10).

The implicit association of the average among a plurality of specific faces has transferred to contemporary interests not only in beauty but in the question of how evolution guides cultural norms. In the research by Matthew Willcox (2015: 11) on the science of decision-making, for instance, he underlines how research is revealing the biological, evolutionary basis of the “intuitive processes, rather than rational ones [that] drive human choices.” The philosopher of art Denis Dutton has, in a parallel vein, recently upset the establishment of art criticism by arguing against generations of both social constructivist and objectivist aesthetic thought for an
idea of aesthetic standards as being universal precisely because they derive from selected traits. Art, writes Dutton (2009: 31), “is tied to human nature,” and human nature has evolved under specific circumstances as a result of natural selection. In this sense, however they express themselves, our tendencies to find certain forms of expression more beautiful than others will ultimately respond to a level of influence that is not individual but, rather, derived from behaviors and choices agglomerated and averaged over multiple generations.

*Pattern Evasion in an Age of Apophenia*

Frederic Jameson famously argued that the postmodern aesthetic was fundamentally indebted to the technique of pastiche and, hence, dependent on a secondary level of creativity that involves making connections between apparently disparate sources. Yet for all its contemporaneity, in subtle and not too subtle ways, the art of pastiche recalls the very processes and techniques that eugenicists like Wells called up to evoke their average standards: disparate particulars are culled for their overlapping, connecting aspects. This strange relation becomes a little clearer if we take seriously Steyerl’s contention of the dissemination of “computer vision” and its corresponding age of “apophenia,” wherein our associations may be guided by such empathy-free pattern recognition algorithms such as FaceNet, a face recognition system developed in 2015 by researchers at Google that achieved what were at the time state of the art results on a range of face recognition benchmark datasets (Brownlee 2019). The biggest internet economies in the world, Russia, China, and the US, have been competing to create the most efficient and reliable face recognition algorithm leading to the
worrisome ethical and privacy implications that accompany these technologies (Chakrabarti 2019). According to one recent source (N-Tech.Lab 2015), the Russian N-Tech.Lab became the leader of facial recognition software, along with Google’s FaceNet, and used their technology to map the largest number of Russian faces for the State’s secret service, even while claiming that it was in fact using them for a dating site. What is of interest here is the question of what happens to “beauty ideals” in an age when the face, the most personal “pattern” of our identities, becomes a data ghost and turns out to be 99% similar to others. At the close of an age in which Jean Epstein located the magic of cinema in the facial closeup and the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas grounded the fundamental ethical impulse in the face of the other person, what are we to make of a technological revolution that leads us to imagine connections where there are none and to make our individual bodily expressions secondary to algorithmically produced averages?

In his 2017 study “Automating Aesthetics: Artificial Intelligence and Image Culture,” Lev Manovich calls our attention to the question of what happens when we “automate” beauty in our current apps. For instance, “the [application]The Roll by EyeEm [Fig. 1.8] automatically rates the aesthetic quality of your photos” (Manovich 2017: 1).
To add to this with a personal anecdote, when I recently came back from Shanghai and imported one of my favorite photos from my travel raw and unedited from my camera, my sixteen-year-old daughter immediately put it through a filter on her iPhone and gave it back to me with a different atmosphere that brought out the obscure darkness of this street scene, a photographer, and a mysterious passerby (Figs. 1.9-10). In so doing, she gave the image more narrative, more of a conversation between the three protagonists with one quick click-and-fix.
The question that Manovich (2017: 1) asks and that is relevant for me is this: “does such automation [lead] to a decrease in cultural diversity over time” and does it make us all create a similar aesthetic? He further asks, “can we use AI methods and large samples of cultural data to measure quantitatively diversity and variability in contemporary culture” (Manovich 2017: 1)? This last question might be enriched with the question of whether we can do so *ethically*. Can we project patterns without the help of a specifically human intuition, a unique or “original” feeling that evades datafication?
Manovich gives a few examples that indicate that we can’t. For instance, while *Game of Thrones* was made with the help of AI storytelling, the actual execution of writing the plot was done by humans. An even more interesting example he mentions is the trailer generated by Watson, a technology developed by IBM for the horror AI thriller *Morgan*. A scientist from IBM is shown teaching the computer program to evaluate what is scary, funny and so on. The outcome is rather convincing, looking and feeling like a Hollywood trailer (Figs. 1.11-12).

![Figure 1.11: Still from AI-generated trailer Morgan (2016)](image1)

But the reason for the success of the automated trailer may not have been Watson’s intelligence—in cutting a trailer from a “mood-palette” already delivered in the actual movie, almost “any” decently cohesive combination of images and quotations from the movie could have created a “good trailer.” The other reason for this relative success is the fact that the
question is not “can computers create?”—because they clearly can—but rather concerns how we interpret what they “say”. In the case of the Morgan trailer, because it is a trailer and because it is a Hollywood movie, we all know how to understand the format. The music, the intonation of the narrator, all of which we have heard and seen before in so many commercial Hollywood films, let us know the formulaic genre and filmic language that we can expect in Morgan. Another experiment would have been to let an editor blindly or “apophenically” push the extract button from the movie in AVID and then decide if the outcome wasn’t a similarly “good trailer.” I bet it would be!

In the age of generalized apophenia, where identity is as visible, accessible, quantified and datafied as ever, the question becomes focused on the way in which this culture affects the sense of our identity and—most importantly—on which identity is at hand. In The Lies that Bind Kwame Anthony Appiah derives much of his anthropological and philosophical wisdom from his own identity of being born into a half-Ghanean, half-British identity, culture and religious practice. In his section on “habitus,” for instance, Appiah (2018: 21) writes about “how central identity is to the way we deploy our bodies.” Habits, as he says, are deployed and shaped by our identities. We learn to dress as a man or woman in ways that are shaped by clothes that fit these body types and norms. The clothes themselves are chosen on the basis of a gender. In our lives, once fully socialized, we end up walking and dressing in ways that reflect our identities, our class, our ethnicity, perhaps our religiosity, and beyond. Identity in this sense, as displayed on our bodies, as part of an aesthetic that we turn outward in the shape of our bodily
presentation, then becomes a call for solidarity, of looking for the patterns of similarity in others.

As we delve into new aesthetic tendencies from photography to fashion we can get a sense that in today’s apophenic age we are trending in two opposite directions. On one hand, we are moving toward a complete datafication and uniformity of ourselves, as for instance can be traced on selfiecity.net (Fig. 1.13), where we can witness the rising uniformity of selfies posted on Instagram in five major cities over recent years. Here trends are revealed that are as unsurprising as the AI trailer for *Morgan*: more women are taking selfies than men and one of the preferred face angles is the result of a picture taken from a supine position.

![Comparison of facial tilt of selfies on selfiecity.net](image)

*Figure 1.13: Comparison of facial tilt of selfies on selfiecity.net*
On the other hand, the trend of what I’d like to call apophenic “pattern evasion,” in which what we aim for are identities that are new, unspoiled, and raw in a way that we have not seen before: identities, in other words, that resist the gravitational pull of the average.

It seems that in this kind of beauty discourse, the lived experience and the access to “truth” in the Platonic sense is all the more relevant in today’s age of a sea of data. If nineteenth-century race theorists and, by implication, their more recent descendants looked for the truth of racial characteristics in generalized composites, the opposing trend also seeks to express truths, precisely by shirking the general and exposing the particular. The new aesthetic that derives from this “pattern-evasive” aesthetic is one that the anthropologist Renato Rosaldo has called a “subjectivity of distance” necessary for social analysis and the anthropologist’s responsibility of assuming multiplex personal identities for their research (Rosaldo, 1989: 168). In Rosaldo’s ethnography, the “norm” is not about “truth” and also no about “beauty”; rather, beauty and truth are the result of a deviance or distance from the norm that the ethnographer assumes through his or her multiplex personal identities via the empathy and understanding they have created toward the “subordinate” group, which is the object of their studies: those who are either surveilled by the larger culture or are identified as criminals as in the essentialist practices of nineteenth-century eugenicists and physiognomists. As an outsider himself, half-Chicano, half-white, Rosaldo talks about the advantage of assuming that point of view of the outsider, an anthropological perspective that for him “problematises a rigid idea of cultures as closed identities, where each person lives solely within one culture.” As he puts it,
we always live between cultures, and I think it can also be said that a
monolingual person always lives between cultures because there are levels of
language, different registers, and one can talk as if on the street, or as if in a
classroom, or at a more formal level, more ceremonial. These levels always exist,
we always live between levels, and we always know how to go from one level to
another. (Rosaldo and Montezemolo 2008: 28)

Precisely because each individual’s identity is constituted at the crossroads of these cultural or
ethnic influences, the choice of a certain look or style becomes beautiful insofar as it expresses
not merely a shattering of mainstream beauty ideals, as with the avant-garde, but new and
more specific cultural patterns. This pattern-evasive identity expression works not only at a
cultural and ethnic crossroads but is also powerfully present in current gender identifications.
The artist Kandis Williams, for instance, grounds her artistic practice in the strategy of troubling
the identity slots the broader culture tries to fit her into. As she puts it,

there’s a kind of weird power or sexual mystique in that, but then it comes from
this same degradation, this animalistic treatment. I’m blown away by how easy it
is for people to objectify me based on three words about how I look: tall, black,
woman. I literally don’t even know what people are looking at when they look at
me. I feel like they must be like blurry-eyed, goggle visions of Beyoncé to King
Kong. It might set someone in any direction, so I really don’t know until I’ve been
around a person for a while at this point why the fuck they’d want to be around me. (Williams and Burlison 2019: 17)

Figure 1.14: Kandis Williams, *Shallow pool of Bacchanal Freedom* (2018)

Not surprisingly, Williams evades any kind of clear interpretation of shapes, forms, or racial identifications in her composite-paintings that could be thought of as the opposite of the “progress” toward Beauty by Lavater. Nothing is clearly in the foreground or background but every shape is a reflection in the reflection, evading a clear definition. This aesthetic, as it works in Figure 1.14 for instance, is literal superimposition of identities and places. Nothing is a oneness or one place, one identity, one color.

In a different aesthetic with a similar message, emerging African-American photographer Deana Lawson tells the story of being black and poor in the US through photographs that are a hybrid
of “home pictures” and photographs that call for a strong position of ethical witnessing. In Fig. 1.15, a young woman with a baby and a young child is asking something of us. But what is it? In Lawson’s case it is not the shape and forms of the figures that evade visual interpretation but, rather, it is the unspoken contract or interpellation with the interlocutor that evades a clear interpretation and interrupts our apophenic impulses.

![Image](image131x263to481x544)

*Figure 1.15: Deana Lawson, Woman with Child (2017)*

In “How to be a Genderqueer Feminist,” the British feminist Laurie Pennie talks about coming out as an individual journey but also a collective weapon, one she is already witnessing as producing a new form of excitement for the in-between, the unknown. As she describes it,
more than anything, I’m excited. I’m excited to see how life is going to be
different for the queer, trans, and even cis kids too, growing up in a world that
has more language for gender variance. I’m excited to find out what sort of lives
they will lead, from the genderqueer activists in the audience at my last reading
to the barista with the orange mohawk who handed me the cup of tea I’m
clutching for dear life as I write alone in this café, trying to believe that writing
this piece is something other than gross self-indulgence.

The barista is wearing two name badges. One says their name; the other
one says, in thick chalk capitals, I am not a girl. My pronouns are They/Them.
(Penney 2015)

TT The Artist echoes these sentiments in an artistic production and philosophy that embraces
ethnic and gender individuality and difference as the very essence of beauty. In fact, reaching
that aesthetic objective requires inhabiting the borders of different media as well as peripheral
gender or racial identities. As she put it in an interview with me, in reference to her African-
American pop art series (Fig. 1.16), “a lot of my black pop series will be a more multimedia
experience. I’m going to dive into doing some sculpture, video installation [...], multisensory
multimedia. That’s my ultimate goal with my visual arts: to intersect everything that I’m
doing.”

3 Interview with the author from September 14, 2019.
TT The Artist is here consciously building on a political movement from the sixties, one that finally asserted the beauty of blackness against the logical opposition entrenched in European aesthetics since at least the medieval period. The inscription under the black Virgin of Tindari in Sicily (Fig. 1.17)—*NIGRA SUM SED FORMOSA* (“I am black but beautiful”)—would now have to be rewritten “I am beautiful *because* I am black!”
Today’s beauty culture revels in exposing the failure of the mean; the deviant-fabulous body is no longer confined to the nightclub but has gone mainstream. Sorry, Marquardt, these new fashion models (Figs. 1.18-20) clearly do not fit the beauty standards defined by your insulting Beauty Mask!
Figure 1.18: Adam Harvey, Look #2 (2010)
Figure 1.19: Radical Beauty Project, Annalie (2019)
But even these don’t simply arise without a history. In the late twentieth century, the designer Alexander McQueen’s “Savage Beauty”, the “Highland Rape” fashion show from 1995-6 brought the “underdog” and the “abused” to the table as the basis for his new fashion line (Fig. 1.21). For McQueen, the Scottish Highlands had been violently deprived of their indigenous aesthetic and, to put it with Rosaldo, this very deprivation became the inspiration for his new model of beauty, who was convulsive in the sense of Breton and evasive and yet also beautiful.
The uncomfortable and yet liberating truth that this new aesthetic explores is that the averaged beauty standards passed down to us never referred to the truths they purported to—Anita Ekberg and the Venus von Willendorf would no more fit the Marquardt mask than these other seemingly shocking examples. These ideals, in other words, were always apophenic, producing or imagining the patterns we sought to find there. As we are discovering today with the advent and dissemination of facial recognition technology, the infinite plurality of our faces doesn’t map all that well. The interdisciplinary artist Leonardo Selvaggio found this out by means of a
project he conducted in Chicago. Knowing these programs are “often best at identifying white
and male faces, because they have been trained on data sets that include disproportionate
numbers of them, and particularly bad at identifying black faces” (Wollan 2019), he
disseminated a 3D mask of his own features on Facebook, which then went on to fool the
services face recognition software each and every time it was used.

Whether in Plato’s time or with data-mining today, all research and philosophy always includes
the subjective or “intuitive” factor, in addition to ostensibly objective measurable variants for
object traits such as simplicity, symmetry, clarity, contrast, or proportion. Attractiveness
research, throughout various political and historical periods, has shown us that *clarity of
interpretation* is one defining factor for beauty. This is where Cramer comes in with his
question: who will interpret all the data that we have put out there? A quick answer would be
the surveillance capitalists. But while all these experiments are fascinating, perhaps it is the
case that even the seemingly overarching standard of clarity is a concept that is ultimately
based on the identity of oneness, implicitly tagging one gender or one race. Let’s recall the *OED*
entry’s second denotation: “an attractive woman” (“Beauty” 2013). Can there be any doubt
that the implied image is not only a binary, heterosexual female, but a white European one as
well? But what was true when that entry was originally penned might not be the case for the
ideals that have come to dominate the technological consumer-society of the twenty-first
century, where hybridity and mixed identity have taken a lead.
Maybe Eco’s biggest nightmare has come true, that in the digital age of social media beauty has become something we not only want to have and consume but might be the even driving force behind our consumer choices. But the good news is that it has allowed other voices such as TT The Artist to present a notion of beauty of being “outside,” one that before the digital day would most likely have not been commercially viable enough to survive.

The snake might be biting its tail in the new Neolithic age (Steyerl 2018) of data-miners and pattern extractors under the management of informational biopolitics. Once thought of as a triad of icon, index, and symbol, exemplified in the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, the sign has been reduced to a pure “symbol” with no connotations and no history. It is user-generated, as Jessica Baldwin-Philippi has argued, a self-reinforcing mechanism impacting social habits, and has been extracted entirely out of its surrounding “noise” in a move redolent of the kind of totalitarian environment described in The Handmaid’s Tale. In this new Neolithic age, an aesthetic has arisen that aims at escaping the apophenic pattern and all its forms of discrimination, aesthetic and political. It is unpredictable. It lives “in between” genders, sexualities, and normalities; it is “pure noise” and very little pattern. It may well be that, as Steyerl (2018: 14) has it, “every spot of our cities is mapped out as a probable crime site, fully decked with gender- and age-based targeted advertising, and surveilled by animated commodities, divinatory cellphone cameras, and aerial views from tapped drones.” And yet, in our surveilled and digitized age, diversity has taken its place by being one way to escape the pattern; and marginal identities have in part claimed their space by elevating such evasions to an aesthetic standard of their own.
Reference List


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